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COMMENTS
REGULATING HIGH-FREQUENCY
TRADING: THE CASE FOR INDIVIDUAL
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
ORLANDO COSME JR.*
The popular imagination of securities trading is a chaotic, physical
stock exchange—a busy floor with hurried traders yelling, “buy, buy, buy!”
While this image is a Hollywood and media favorite, it is no longer
accurate. In 2019, most securities trading is conducted electronically on
digital markets. One type of trading strategy, high-frequency trading,
utilizes algorithms, data centers, fiber optic cables, and supercomputers to
obtain an edge in the market. High-frequency trading has leveraged
advancements in technology to constitute over half of all trading volume in
a given day.
High-frequency trading, however, has come under scrutiny in recent
years as it has increased market susceptibility to certain forms of criminal
conduct. In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the first conviction of a high-frequency trader for spoofing, a type of trader
misconduct that is made more susceptible by high-frequency trading. While
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my brother, Alex, for being forever supportive. Thank you to all of the members of the
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Professor Nadav Shoked for providing me with guidance.
I would also like to note that it is not my belief that the United States should broadly
increase criminal prosecutions, and I am concerned with over-criminalization more
generally. Rather, it is my position that as long as the criminal law is used as a tool for social
control in other contexts, it is only fair to examine this tool in the “white collar” arena as
well.
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scholars have debated whether high-frequency trading should be regulated
more than other types of trading and if so, what the regulations might look
like, no one has analyzed criminal law as a vehicle to regulate highfrequency trading.
This Comment makes the case that individual criminal liability is an
ideal tool to regulate misconduct in the high-frequency trading space. Two
features of high-frequency trading make the strategy particularly
challenging to regulate: 1) it is difficult to draw a line between legitimate
and illegitimate behavior in high-frequency trading; and 2) it is difficult to
pinpoint an exact definition of what high-frequency trading is. Criminal
liability has several advantages over civil liability with respect to these
challenges. First, the mens rea component and higher standard of proof
required in criminal liability will ensure that high-frequency traders found
criminally liable engaged in illegitimate behavior with a higher degree of
certainty. Second, the threat of criminal prosecution will better serve the
goal of deterring high-frequency trader misconduct. Within the context of
criminal liability, individual criminal liability is preferable to corporate
criminal liability because the former better furthers the goal of deterrence.
The identity problem that corporate liability helps to solve—in some
corporate contexts it is impossible to pinpoint culpability on any single
individual—is not an issue in high-frequency trading; and individual
criminal liability is socially more preferable as a matter of policy.
Accordingly, the government should increase criminal enforcement of highfrequency traders to promote its goal of safeguarding market integrity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology has crept into most aspects of modern society, and
securities trading is no different.1 Gone are the iconic days of traders
yelling in the “pits” of stock exchanges.2 Nowadays, trading occurs on
computer screens in digital markets.3 Trading has moved from the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to data centers, fiber optic cables, and
supercomputers located far from Wall Street.4 One trading strategy, highfrequency trading (HFT), leverages this advancement in technology by
utilizing sophisticated computer programs that trade at ultrafast speeds to
obtain an edge in the market.5 While HFT has many benefits, such as
increased market efficiency,6 it also has “increased market susceptibility to
certain forms of criminal conduct.”7

1
Gregory Meyer, Trading: What Happened when the Pit Stopped, FIN. TIMES (July 6,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4d221b22-3dfb-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0 (source on file
with author).
2
Id. See also Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical
Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 948 (1994):

Futures contracts are bought and sold in centralized trading ‘pits’ in an open outcry
auction. Customers submit buy and sell orders for futures contracts to brokerage
firms. These firms transmit the orders to brokers located in the pit. The brokers call
out their desire to buy or sell, and other traders in the pit compete to take the other
side of the trade. The broker accepts the best bid or offer made in the pit to fill his
order. In addition to trading for customers, some pit participants trade on their own
account. Id.
3

United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2017).
Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L. J. 1253, 1255 (2017).
5
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 786.
6
Lazaro I. Vazquez, High Frequency Trading: Is Regulation the Answer?, 17 WAKE
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 151, 172 (2017).
7
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 786; see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CONCEPT RELEASE ON
EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE, 75 Fed Reg 3594, 3606 (2010) (noting four strategies that are
particularly susceptible to wrongdoing by HFT).
4
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The 2008 Financial Crisis brought the regulation of financial markets
under increased scrutiny.8 This increased scrutiny coincided with the rise
of HFT.9 The public, frustrated with the financial sector, demanded
reforms to ensure that Wall Street did not continue with business as usual.10
Events such as the Flash Crash—during which on May 6, 2010, several
markets, aided partly by HFT, quickly collapsed and rebounded—ensured
that HFT did not escape these calls for more regulation.11 However,
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, the main legislative response to the
financial crisis, in 2010—a few years before HFT obtained market
hegemony. Accordingly, the law has no provision that specifically
regulates HFT.12 But what should this regulation be? One tool that
governments can use to regulate high-frequency trader misconduct is
individual criminal liability. In August 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed United States v. Coscia,13 upholding the first
criminal conviction of a high-frequency trader for spoofing—increasing the
relevance of individual corporate criminal liability for illegal highfrequency trading.14
Following the example in Coscia, prosecuting traders in HFT—as
opposed to the entities that the traders work for or other forms of
8

See Anna Driggers, Raj Rajaratnam’s Historic Insider Trading Sentence, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 2021, 2034 (2012) (“In response to the 2008 financial crisis, there has been
public outrage and demand for punishment of those on Wall Street.”).
9
See Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 14:14 (Oct.
2017).
10
See Driggers, supra note 8, at 2034.
11
Andrei Kirilenko, et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on
an Electronic Market 1 (May 5, 2014); Peter J. Henning, Why High-Frequency Trading is So
Hard to Regulate, DealBook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014, 1:40 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/why-high-frequency-trading-is-so-hard-toregulate/ [http://perma.cc/4RTQ-X62V].
12
See R. Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The Volcker Rule’s Reliance on Definitions
Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution is Needed to Adequately Regulate Proprietary
Trading, 8 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 33, 34 (2011); Vazquez, supra note 6, at 163
(discussing how “[v]ery little, if any, federal statutory law directly targets the practice of
HFT[,]” including the Dodd-Frank Act). The Dodd-Frank Act mentions “high-frequency
trading” only once. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, PUB. L.
NO. 111-203 124 STAT. 1976 (2010) [hereinafter “DFA”]. The provision commands the
Securities and Exchange Commission to conduct a study of “the effect of high-frequency
trading and other technological advances on the market and what the SEC requires to
monitor the effect of such trading and advances on the market[.]” DFA § 967 (a)(1)–(2)(D).
13
United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2017).
14
Reuters Staff, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Trader’s Spoofing Conviction, REUTERS
(Aug. 7, 2017, 7:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-spoofing/u-s-appealscourt-upholds-traders-spoofing-conviction-idUSKBN1AO00F
[http://perma.cc/FZ8AMJGU].
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regulation—would better serve the government’s goal of promoting fair and
efficient financial markets. While scholars have discussed which legal
tools should be used to regulate and police high-frequency trading,15 no one
has analyzed individual criminal liability as a possible solution. This
Comment does so. But it leaves further discussion on the topic—like
potential HFT criminal legislation or ways to increase criminal HFT
enforcement—to future scholarship.
First, this Comment provides necessary background information. This
includes an explanation of HFT and the issues that arise in attempting to
regulate the practice, elaboration of the current HFT regulatory landscape,
and a description of the laws currently impacting HFT. Next, this
Comment shows how criminal law can better ensure that high-frequency
traders are not penalized for legitimate trading activity, which is a major
concern of HFT regulation,16 while still deterring other high-frequency
traders from engaging in wrongdoing. Finally, this Comment argues that
within criminal law, individual liability should be used because it better
furthers the goal of deterrence. Culpable individuals are easily identifiable
in HFT, and, when applied to HFT, individual criminal liability leads to
preferable consequences. Therefore, criminal enforcement of wrongdoing
through individual liability should be utilized to regulate HFT.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AN OVERVIEW OF HFT

Although pinning down a precise definition has confounded
regulators,17 the fundamental mechanism at the core of HFT is fairly
straightforward: trading firms execute large volumes of trades at lightning
fast speeds with the help of computer software.18 An example of a simple
HFT strategy, exchange arbitrage, is illustrative. In exchange arbitrage,
high-frequency traders take advantage of the minor discrepancies in a
security’s price that occur between different exchanges.19 The trader buys
low on one exchange and then sells high on another.20 The speed at which
these trades are executed is vital because the price discrepancies between
15

See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 6, at 151.
Peter J. Henning, Why High-Frequency Trading is So Hard to Regulate, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 2014, 1:40 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/why-highfrequency-trading-is-so-hard-to-regulate/ [http://perma.cc/4RTQ-X62V].
17
See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.
18
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 786.
19
Id.
20
Id.
16
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exchanges only last for a very short period of time—often fractions of a
second.21
Although such price discrepancies are extremely small,
significant profits can be made with high volumes of trades.22
Speed is vital to any HFT strategy. To ensure that they are trading the
fastest, HFT firms lease or purchase property as close to exchange data
centers and servers as possible.23 HFT firms also purchase (from
exchanges) special access to high-speed cables—allowing them to trade on
the exchange more quickly.24 Accordingly, HFT gains its market advantage
by superior and faster trading connections.
Concerns over HFT have grown since the Flash Crash,25 which I will
discuss later in Part II of this Comment, and as the percentage of HFT in
terms of total trading volume has increased to between “40 to 70 percent of
all trading.”26 As of 2016, HFT constituted a $28 billion industry.27
Although the rise of HFT has raised some concerns, there are many
positive effects of the practice. First, it can be very profitable for the trader
and trading firm.28 Second, HFT is beneficial to capital markets because it
increases liquidity.29 Liquidity is one of the most, if not the most, important
market characteristics that investors consider.30 By acting “as a sort of
shock absorber,” liquidity smooths volatile price swings.31 Additionally,
increased liquidity from HFT increases the willingness of intermediaries
that buy and sell securities on their own account (market makers) to transact
trades, which in turn further increases liquidity and trading volume. 32
Increased liquidity from HFT has also decreased transaction costs.33
Finally, HFT arbitrage closes gaps between markets and allows prices to
more quickly reflect new information.34 Thus, HFT makes markets more
efficient.35
21

Id.
Id.
23
See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 62–63, 73, 79 (2014).
24
Lin, supra note 4, at 1267.
25
Henning, supra note 16.
26
Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 14:14 (October
2017).
27
Vazquez, supra note 6, at 163.
28
United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2017).
29
Vazquez, supra note 6, at 171.
30
Id.
31
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 172.
34
Id.
35
Id.
22
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Some of these perceived benefits, however, may actually negatively
impact the market. Scholars have noted that HFT can harm traditional
investors.36 For example, consider the following scenario: An individual
calls their broker to submit an order to buy $60,000 worth of a certain
stock. The broker can currently buy the stock for $60 per share, requiring
1,000 shares at that price to fill the individual’s order. The broker notices
that 500 shares of the stock are being offered on NASDAQ, 300 shares are
being offered on the NYSE, and 200 shares on the BATS Global exchange.
The broker submits orders in all three exchanges to purchase the 1,000
shares. However, after clicking “submit” on his computer, the broker
receives a notification that he purchased less than 1,000 shares. Surprised,
he looks at his screen and sees that the cheapest offer for the stock is now
above $60.37 Due to their speed and information edge, high-frequency
traders were able to notice “the first portion of the broker’s order on one
exchange, registered that he was interested in purchasing that security,
bought it themselves on the second exchange, and offered it back to the
broker at a higher price when his request reached the second exchange.”38
Because the high-frequency traders anticipated a larger trade when the
order first began to fill, the traditional investor either had to settle with less
than the 1,000 shares she ordered or fill the order at a higher price.39 Thus,
by quickly buying and selling securities, HFT unnecessarily raises prices
for non-HFT firms.40
Furthermore, even though HFT has been noted to smooth out
volatility, it can also paradoxically increase volatility. 41 Situations may
occur where, due to HFT being a form of algorithmic trading, “a predatory
algorithm can lock in a profit for a proprietary firm from an artificial
increase or decrease in price.”42 This can cause a security’s price to move
substantially for no tangible reason, causing traders to lose significant
amounts of money.43
Additionally, the speed at which high-frequency traders can execute
trades “has increased market susceptibility to certain forms of criminal

36

Tara E. Levens, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High-Frequency Trading and Securities
Class Actions, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1532–33 (2015) (citing LEWIS, supra note 23, at
171).
37
For a similar example, see id. at 1511.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See Lewis, supra note 23, at 76, 78.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 175.
43
Id.
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conduct.”44 One such strategy is spoofing45—where traders enter buy and
sell orders for a security with no intention of executing the order, but rather
to manipulate the price of the security in a certain direction so that they
profit.46
Moreover, another key feature of HFT is that it can blur the line
between legitimate trading activity and market manipulation.47 Market
manipulation was prohibited as part of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.48 The relevant provision states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . .
(1) For the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in
any security other than a government security, or a false or misleading appearance
with respect to the market for any such security, (A) to effect any transaction in such
security which involves no change in the beneficial ownership thereof, or (B) to enter
an order or orders for the purchase of such security with the knowledge that an order
or orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time, and at
substantially the same price, for the sale of any such security, has been or will be
entered by or for the same or different parties, or (C) to enter any order or orders for
the sale of any such security with the knowledge that an order or orders of
substantially the same size, at substantially the same time, and at substantially the
same price, for the purchase of such security, has been or will be entered by or for the
same or different parties.
(2) To effect, alone or with 1 or more other persons, a series of transactions in any
security registered on a national securities exchange, any security not so registered, or
in connection with any security-based swap or security-based swap agreement with
respect to such security creating actual or apparent active trading in such security, or
raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the
purchase or sale of such security by others.49

Accordingly, a high-frequency trader may violate this provision if they
enter simultaneous buy and sell orders to purposely create “a false or
misleading appearance of active trading[.]” Once the market moves in one
direction, the trader can use their speed to cancel their orders on the side of
the market that would lead to losses, while keeping and filling their orders
on the other side of the market that is favorable to the price movement—
ensuring profits. Thus, high cancellation rates can be evidence of market

44

United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id.
46
John I. Sanders, Spoofing: A Proposal for Normalizing Divergent Securities and
Commodities Futures Regimes, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 517, 518–19 (2016).
47
See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 175.
48
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
49
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
45
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manipulation.50 However, some legitimate HFT strategies that place
multiple bids and offers may also lead to high cancellation rates. 51
Therefore, certain HFT strategies must be observed carefully because high
cancellation rates can indicate both a high-frequency trader engaging in
market manipulation and providing market liquidity.52 This blurring
between legitimate and illegitimate behavior will be discussed more
thoroughly in the Regulating HFT section of this Comment.
B. THE FLASH CRASH

The negative impact of high-frequency trading caught the world’s
attention after the Flash Crash.53 During a thirty-six minute period on the
afternoon of May 6, 2010, American markets experienced one of the most
volatile periods in their history.54 Major stock market indices, such as the
S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq 100, and the Russell
2000, “collapsed and rebounded with extraordinary velocity.”55 The rapid
collapse and just-as-sudden rebound was not limited to the stock market.
Futures, options, and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) “experienced
extraordinary price volatility often accompanied by spikes in trading
volume.”56 Given the rapid collapse of prices across financial markets,
these events became known as the “Flash Crash.”57
HFT has been cited as a factor in the Flash Crash. Michael Lewis’
book, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt, increased scrutiny of HFT by
linking them to the events of May 6, 2010.58 Lewis specifically criticized
HFT’s use of complex computer programs that “whipsaw prices by
flooding the market with orders in milliseconds.”59 The Commodity Future
Trading Commission (CFTC) has also stated that HFT was a contributor to
the Flash Crash.60 According to the CFTC, the ability of HFT to quickly
absorb trading volume creates price adjustments that are costly to

50

Id.
Vazquez, supra note 6, at 157.
52
Id. at 171.
53
Henning, supra note 16.
54
See generally Andrei Kirilenko, et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High
Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market, J. FIN. 1 (2014).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Henning, supra note 16.
59
Id.
60
Kirilenko, supra note 54.
51
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traditional market makers and other slower traders.61 This incentivizes
market makers to keep “their inventory holdings to levels that can be too
low to offset temporary liquidity imbalances.”62 As a result, a gigantic sell
order can “lead to a liquidity-based crash accompanied by high trading
volume and large price volatility.”63 This is what occurred during the
Flash Crash with E-mini S&P 500 stock index futures—which then spread
quickly to other markets.64 The Flash Crash, or the potential for other
similar events, along with the increased susceptibility to illegitimate
trading, demonstrates the need to provide some sort of oversight to HFT.
C. REGULATING HFT

Regulating HFT raises two major challenges. First, it is difficult to
discern the difference between legitimate and illegitimate behavior due to
the complexities of HFT trading strategies.65 Second, even if a bright line
could be drawn, there is no settled definition as to what constitutes HFT.66
1.

Drawing a Line Between Acceptable and Unacceptable Behavior

The difficulty in separating legitimate and illegitimate behavior is
particularly an issue when the HFT acts as a market maker—an
intermediary handling client trades on the HFT’s own account.67 Market
makers often have the liberty “to select the venue of [their] choice at no or
little cost to [their] client[s].”68 What makes wrongdoing by HFT market
makers so difficult to separate from legitimate behavior is that the clientfacing business provides the market maker with a justification for many
trades.69 For example, a high-frequency trader involved in market making

61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq 100, and the Russell 2000, as
well as derivatives such as futures, options, and ETFs collapsed and rebounded.
65
Henning, supra note 16.
66
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N , CONCEPT RELEASE ON EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE,
supra note 7 (noting that it is better to focus on tools and strategies employed by HFT “than
attempt any single, precise definition of HFT”).
67
See Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 264 n.267
(2015) (“These difficulties [of showing that a trader is acting manipulatively] are only
greater when the trader is an intermediary handling trades for a client . . . ”).
68
Id.
69
See id.
62
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can state that any suspect trades were simply made to hedge a client’s
order.70 As Andrew Verstein noted:
The presence of an offsetting customer order is helpful circumstantial evidence for
the manipulator. Indeed, it is telling that regulators will be drawn down the rabbit hole
of showing a lack of offsetting customer orders; historically, the CFTC has spent its
time trying to show the presence of offsetting orders. The Commodity Exchange Act
specifically prohibits wash trades, or transactions designed to offset one another and
thereby eliminate any economic substance. Complex institutions with responsibilities
for other people’s money gain a smokescreen against regulatory scrutiny as they
pursue non-fraudulent manipulations.71

Therefore, the nature of legitimate client-driven trading business blurs
the line between legal and illegal HFT conduct.
A 2014 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) settlement
against Athena Capital Research demonstrates the difficulty regulators have
in drawing a line between legal and illegal conduct in HFT.72 The SEC
called the settlement the “first high frequency trading manipulation case.”73
The settlement order stated that Athena utilized a sophisticated algorithm
that carried out a manipulative scheme where it would enter trading orders
in the last two seconds of trading in order to push stock prices in a direction
that would favor their other positions.74 The difficulty with respect to
regulation, however, arose in determining whether the trader intended to
either artificially affect prices—and therefore commit market
manipulation—or simply generate profit with trades that had a genuine
economic purpose.75
70

See id. For example, a client may go to a HFT market maker wishing to sell
$1,000,000 of a certain security. If the high-frequency trader decides to fulfill the order, then
they would buy the security using the high-frequency trader’s own account. Thus, the highfrequency trader would be “long” $1,000,000 worth of that security. To hedge their exposure
from this client-generated long position, the high-frequency trader may sell that security, sell
another correlated security, or buy/sell a correlated derivative.
71
Id. at 264 n.267.
72
See Press Release, SEC Charges New York-Based High Frequency Trading Firm With
Fraudulent Trading to Manipulate Closing Prices: First High Frequency Trading
Manipulation Case, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2014), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-229#.VEOZlfldV8E [http://perma.cc/RJ9PGE46].
73
Id.
74
Athena Capital Research, LLC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 73369,
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199, at 2 (SEC Oct. 16, 2014).
75
See Henning, supra note 16. See also Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56
B.C. L. REV. 215, 263 (2015) (“Courts seem to agree that a party cannot be a manipulator if
she makes only real trades with sufficient genuine economic purposes. That is, an actual
purchase of securities, motivated by a desire to own the securities, cannot be manipulation,
even if you also wished to influence the price.”).
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In the Athena case, the SEC used e-mails from Athena managers,
which stated that the goal of that particular algorithm was to change
prices.76 The settlement order also contained internal e-mails stating that
the firm’s strategy was to dominate the auction and “owning the game.” 77
Yet, it appears from the SEC’s order that these statements alone may not
have been sufficient to prove illegal market manipulation.78 Additionally,
the order provided great detail about how Athena would enter buy or sell
orders ten minutes before the 4 p.m. close, and then would “flood[] the
market with orders on the opposite side of that trade in the last two seconds
of trading.”79 This would push the price for that stock towards the order
entered ten minutes before the close and allow a profit from the price
movement.80 However, Athena also provided a service to clients via its
trading by acting as a market maker and executing orders that may not have
been filled at the close.81 At least some of Athena’s trades, then, assisted
investors.82 It therefore appears that trading conduct or statements
indicating a purpose to change prices are not sufficient on their own to
prove illegal market manipulation.
2.

Defining HFT

The lack of any set definition of HFT makes regulatory oversight
difficult. To provide regulatory oversight, an agency would have to invent
its own definition of HFT.83 Defining HFT would necessarily require
distinguishing HFT from other types of trading. However, the proliferation
of computer-assisted tools in modern day trading has made this separation
problematic.84 Notwithstanding this challenge, an agency would then have
to supervise firms that fall within this definition, and these firms would

76

Henning, supra note 16.
Press Release, supra note 72.
78
See Henning, supra note 16.
79
Id.
80
See id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.
84
See Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, Equity Market Structure Literature
Review: Part II; High Frequency Trading at *5 (SEC, Mar 18, 2014) (“other types of
computer-assisted trading tools are common in today’s markets that may generate market
activity that is difficult to distinguish from HFT . . . . These tools include smart order routing
systems that are designed to deal with the large number of trading venues in the fragmented
U.S. equity market structure.”).
77
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have to meet certain requirements.85 The agency would have to examine
the regulated firm and “determine which specific trades warrant civil [or]
criminal liability” (illegal trades).86 While providing the benefit of policing
illegitimate behavior, such oversight would also be burdensome and costly
for both the agency and the firms being regulated.87 The main issue with
this regulatory regime, however, is that attempts to define the practice are
either under- or over-inclusive, with problems arising from each scenario.88
American agencies have currently adopted an over-inclusive
“characteristic and attribute oriented approach” to define HFT.89 The
elements of this definition include both legal and illegal trades.90 This
approach to defining HFT overlaps with the characteristics and attributes
associated with other non-HFT algorithmic and automated trading strategies
(ATS).91 For example, the SEC has noted a common ATS which utilizes
large order execution algorithms on behalf of institutional investors. 92
These algorithms “take[] institutional investor orders, which typically are
too large to be executed all at once without excessive price impact, and
slice[] them into many small orders that are fed into the marketplace over
time.”93 The SEC noted that these large order execution algorithms should
not be considered “HFT because they typically enable institutional
investors to establish or liquidate positions with time horizons far beyond
the primarily intraday horizons characteristic of HFT.”94 These non-HFT
ATS do not have the same susceptibility to illegal trades and consequently
85
See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160. The SEC, for example, utilizes several
characteristics to define HFT. Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84 at
*4. These include:

1. Use of extraordinarily high speed and sophisticated programs for generating,
routing, and executing orders. 2. Use of co-location services and individual data feeds
offered by exchanges and others to minimize network and other latencies. 3. Very
short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions. 4. Submission of
numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission. 5. Ending the trading day
in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying significant, unhedged
positions overnight). Id.
86

Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.
See id.
88
See id. See also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CONCEPT RELEASE ON EQUITY MARKET
STRUCTURE, supra note 7 (SEC admitting that its own definition of HFT is both over and
under-inclusive).
89
Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.
90
Id. at 160–61.
91
Id.
92
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7 at 3606.
93
Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84 at 5.
94
Id.
87
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do not warrant the same type of oversight.95 Thus, in an attempt to rein in
illegal behavior by HFT firms, this definition would capture non-HFT firms
engaged in acceptable trading activity and hold them to closer scrutiny.96
Such an outcome would be inefficient as it would waste resources and
increase costs for both the regulator and supervised firms. 97
However, an under-inclusive definition is also problematic. In an
under-inclusive definition, firms that do not meet the specific thresholds for
regulation would avoid oversight altogether.98 This would allow HFT firms
that do not meet the narrow definition to be able to conduct illegal trades
without consequence.99 For example, while admitting that its own
definition is over-inclusive, the SEC has also stated that its definition of
HFT is simultaneously under-inclusive as well because limiting HFT to the
specific characteristics it had identified100 would “inappropriately narrow
the range of firms that are classified as HFT.”101 To avoid this, regulators,
such as the SEC, could provide an additional set of measures to firms that
do not meet these specific criteria, but still conduct similar strategies.102
Such an approach, however, “would be unnecessarily costly and expose
regulators to multiple rounds of administrative oversight.”103 Accordingly,
the difficulty in discerning legitimate and illegitimate HFT behavior and in
even providing an accurate definition of the practice has made HFT
regulation difficult.
D. CURRENT LAWS IMPACTING HFT

Current federal statutory law has very little, if any, direct focus on
HFT.104 The Dodd-Frank Act’s Volcker Rule105 does limit banks’ abilities

95

See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 161.
Id. See also Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84 at *5 (noting
that an issue with the SEC’s definition of HFT is that “in the absence of trading account
data, the use of general proxies for HFT that can be calculated with publicly available,
market-wide data may capture a great deal of algorithmic and computer-assisted trading that
should not be classified as HFT.”).
97
See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets, supra note 84, at *4 (stating the
characteristics that the SEC has identified to define HFT).
101
Id.
102
See Vazquez, supra note 6, at 160.
103
Id.
104
Id.at 163.
105
The Volcker Rule, or § 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, restricts certain banking entities
from engaging in certain financial activities, such as proprietary trading, investing in private
96
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to engage in HFT strategies through restrictions on their ability to trade.106
However, many of the entities that engage in HFT are not banks, but rather
hedge funds, proprietary trading firms, or mutual funds.107 In practice, the
Volcker Rule has simply made HFT shift away from large banks towards
these smaller HFT firms.108
The Dodd-Frank Act did, however, target a practice that is made more
feasible through HFT by amending the Commodities and Exchange Act
(CEA) to criminalize spoofing.109 As mentioned previously, The DoddFrank Act defines spoofing as “bidding or offering with the intent to cancel
the bid or offer before execution[.]”110 John I. Sanders further defines
spoofing as a strategy where a trader, or spoofer, places “large trades in
hopes of inducing others to act in response to those trades; the ‘spoofer’
then cancels his initial trades in order to capture a profit on trading
positions he holds on the opposite side of the market.”111 Spoofing, similar
to legitimate HFT, uses lightning fast trading strategies.112 Whereas
legitimate trading takes advantage of naturally occurring market events,
spoofing involves artificially moving the price of a security.113 The
Seventh Circuit has explained simply how this artificial price movement
can occur:
This artificial movement is accomplished in a number of ways, although it is most
simply realized by placing large and small orders on opposite sides of the market. The
small order is placed at a desired price, which is either above or below the current
market price, depending on whether the trader wants to buy or sell. If the trader wants
to buy, the price on the small batch will be lower than the market price; if the trader
wants to sell, the price on the small batch will be higher. Large orders are then placed
on the opposite side of the market at prices designed to shift the market toward the
price at which the small order was listed.114

Thus, while not mentioning HFT by name, Congress did target one
illegitimate trading strategy that has been made much easier through HFT.
equity funds, and investing in private equity funds. R. Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The
Volcker Rule’s Reliance on Definitions Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution is Needed
to Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 33, 34
(2011).
106
Vazquez, supra note 6, at 163.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Coscia,
100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (unpublished).
110
7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(c) (2012).
111
Sanders, supra note 46, at 518–19.
112
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787.
113
Id.
114
Id.

380

COSME

[Vol. 109

E. UNITED STATES V. COSCIA

In 2017, the Seventh Circuit upheld the first conviction based on this
anti-spoofing provision.115 The case, Coscia, helps to illustrate an example
of distinguishing illegal HFT practices from legal ones and how individual
criminal liability can regulate them. In 2014, Coscia was indicted for
commodities fraud and spoofing based on trading activity he conducted for
approximately ten weeks in 2011.116 About a year after being charged, a
jury found him guilty on all counts.117 Testimony at the trial showed that
during these ten weeks, Coscia would conduct a very particular pattern of
trading activity. 118 If he wanted to buy, Coscia would place a small order
below the current market price.119 He would then place large sell orders, at
ten times the amount of the small buy order, above the current market price,
on the other side of the market.120 The large orders would create a
perception of abundant market supply, pushing the market price down.121
At trial, the government introduced evidence that Coscia intended to cancel
the large orders before they were executed with the help of two
programs.122 The creators of the programs testified that Coscia directed
them to make the program “act like a decoy” and so designed it to “get a
reaction from the other algorithms.”123 One creator testified that he created
the algorithm to cancel the large orders “in three particular circumstances:
(1) based on the passage of time (usually measured in milliseconds); (2) the
partial filling of the large orders; or (3) complete filling of the small
orders.”124 The speed at which Coscia could place and cancel orders
(milliseconds), and by extension HFT, is what allowed his illegal scheme to
be successful and generate him profits.125
Although there are benefits to HFT, situations like the Flash Crash and
the illegal trades conducted by Coscia demonstrate the dangers of the
practice. Conduct like spoofing, which creates false supply and demand so
115
Nate Raymond, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Trader’s Spoofing Conviction, REUTERS
(Aug. 7, 2017), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-spoofing/u-sappeals-court-upholds-traders-spoofing-conviction-idUSKBN1AO00F
[http://perma.cc/FZ8A-MJGU].
116
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787–88.
117
Id. at 790.
118
Id. at 788.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See id.
122
Id. at 788–89.
123
Id. at 789.
124
Id.
125
See id. at 788–89.
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that the spoofer can profit, damages the integrity of the market and alienates
investors.126 Without entering into a thorough analysis of whether
regulation of HFT is appropriate, I will assume that these dangers are
sufficient to warrant regulation of the practice.
III. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS A TOOL TO REGULATE HFT
The rest of this Comment will argue that individual criminal liability
for illegal conduct by high-frequency traders, as exemplified in Coscia, is
an optimal enforcement paradigm for HFT regulation. First, this Comment
will show that certain advantages of criminal law make it preferable for
ascertaining liability to other forms of regulation, especially as it applies to
HFT. It will also argue that criminal law would better further the goal of
general deterrence. Next, this Comment will make the case that the
individual culpable traders should be prosecuted instead of the firms that
employ them. It will argue that individual criminal liability furthers the
goal of deterrence more so than corporate criminal liability. Moreover, it
will highlight that one of the reasons for corporate criminal liability—the
difficulty in identifying the culpable party—is not present in HFT. Finally,
this Comment will conclude by discussing the consequences of applying
corporate criminal liability to HFT and demonstrating why individual
criminal liability is more appropriate.
A. ADVANTAGES OF CRIMINAL LAW

1.

Intentionality and Standard of Proof

Criminal liability has major advantages over other forms of regulation
with respect to illegitimate behavior in the HFT space. First, criminal
liability would better tackle a major concern in regulating HFT—how to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate trades. Given the speed at
which high-frequency traders place and cancel orders, the difficulty in
drawing a line between illusory and real supply-and-demand is greater.127
Thus, the problem is more pressing compared to other traditional forms of
trading. Compared to civil liability, the mens rea component inherent in
criminal liability, combined with criminal law’s heightened burden of proof
126
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“Although informational
disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture
their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is
unchecked by law.”); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Who would
knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys.
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
127
See Coscia, 866 F.3d at 787.
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standard, better ensures that liability is only found when a high-frequency
trader clearly, and beyond a reasonable doubt, had the intention to engage
in illegal trading.
Criminal law functions to punish the culpable; those who do not have
culpability should not be criminally sanctioned.128 Given the complexities
of HFT, there may be a fear that a trader could be held criminally liable for
legitimate behavior. As the Athena Capital example showed, even though
the firm was fined and given an administrative order, the possibility still
existed that some of its trades served a purpose to clients via market
making.129 Thus, the line in the HFT space between legal trading activity
and wrongful conduct can be blurry. However, criminal laws usually
include a culpability, or mens rea, component130 that must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.131 The requisite mens rea and higher burden of
proof in an individual criminal prosecution would better ensure that highfrequency traders actually committed illegal conduct.
Coscia exemplifies this concept. In Coscia, the defendant argued that
the definition of spoofing in the Dodd-Frank Act, even if it provided notice,
was too arbitrary.132 Specifically, he noted “that high-frequency traders
cancel 98% of orders before execution and that there are simply no
‘tangible parameters to distinguish [Mr.] Coscia’s purported intent from
that of the other traders.’”133 However, in the American criminal justice
system, a defendant must prove that enforcement in his individual case was
arbitrary to avoid being held criminally liable.134 Therefore, arbitrary
enforcement would not be an issue because, like in Coscia, a defendant’s
128
J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptulizing Insider Trading: United States v. Newman and
the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (2015).
129
Henning, supra note 16.
130
See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“We start with the
familiar proposition that ‘[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’”) (alterations in
original).
131
Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity
and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1074 (2007).
132
Coscia, 866 F.3d at 793.
133
Id.
134
See id. at 794:

[T]he defendant must prove that his prosecution arose from arbitrary enforcement. As
explained by the Second Circuit, this inquiry ‘involve[s] determining whether the
conduct at issue falls so squarely in the core of what is prohibited by the law that
there is no substantial concern about arbitrary enforcement because no reasonable
enforcing officer could doubt the law’s application in the circumstances.
(quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 494 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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conduct would have to fall well within a statute’s prohibited conduct to be
convicted.
Furthermore, Coscia also demonstrates how criminal law provides a
solution to the blurry line between legitimate and illegitimate trading. In the
Dodd Frank anti-spoofing provision, a defendant must have had “the intent
to cancel the bid or offer before execution.”135 As the Seventh Circuit
noted, “[c]riminal prosecution is thus limited to the pool of traders who
exhibit the requisite criminal intent.”136 The court further opined:
the anti-spoofing statute’s intent requirement renders spoofing meaningfully different
from legal trades such as ‘stop-loss orders’ (‘an order to sell a security once it reaches
a certain price’) or ‘fill-or-kill orders’ (‘an order that must be executed in full
immediately, or the entire order is cancelled’) because those orders are designed to be
executed upon the arrival of certain subsequent events. Spoofing, on the other hand,
requires, an intent to cancel the order at the time it was placed.137

Thus, like the anti-spoofing provision, Congress can criminalize unwanted
practices in HFT that would avoid arbitrary enforcement by requiring an
intentionality element in their statutes.
2.

General Deterrence

Another advantage of using criminal law to regulate wrongdoing in
HFT is that it would further the goals of general deterrence more than other
forms of regulation. For white collar cases in particular, general deterrence
is the main focus.138 The threat of incarceration more potently discourages
behavior than a system of pricing, such as civil liability.139 There may be
some concern that convictions will lead to offenders going to jail for an
unnecessarily long time. This concern is likely inflamed by the recent trend
in white collar crime of increased prison sentences.140 An example is the
conviction of Raj Rajaratnam, who received the longest prison sentence for

135

7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added).
Coscia, 866 F.3d. at 794.
137
Id. at 795 (emphasis added).
138
Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3143,
3182 (2014).
139
Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on
the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 134
(2000–2001) (“A logical rationale for the extension of the criminal sanction to economic
activity is the perceived need for more potent deterrents than those offered through a system
of pricing. Incarceration and fines serve to inhibit these actions more than other methods of
social control.”).
140
Driggers, supra note 8, at 2034 (“Rajaratnam’s prison sentence is likely . . . a
reflection of the trend toward increased incarceration of white collar criminals generally.”).
136
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insider trading in history.141 However, prosecutors do not need to seek out
long sentences to be effective.142 In fact, it is the threat of prosecution
period, and not the length of prison sentences, that will deter highfrequency traders.143 Therefore, to increase deterrence of wrongdoing by
high-frequency traders, prosecutors must simply increase criminal
enforcement rather than seek long prison sentences.
General deterrence dissuades society as a whole from engaging in a
particular offense by legally punishing those who commit the offense.144
There are two types of general deterrence—marginal general deterrence and
absolute general deterrence.145 Marginal deterrence is the deterrent effect
obtained from increasingly harsher penalties.146 However, studies suggest
that increasing sentences for an already criminalized offense does not
decrease the frequency of that offense.147 A 2014 study by the National
Research Council analyzed numerous studies and found that there was
almost no connection between the crime rate and harsh criminal
penalties.148 Although some scholars argue that fewer white collar
offenders should be imprisoned and that “[m]arginal general deterrence

141

Id. at 2021.
See Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargain,
and the Loss of Innocence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 740 (2013) (“As noted above, increasing
sentences, particularly where the conduct is already criminalized, does not decrease the
occurrence of the offense.”).
143
See id. at 739–40 (“Interestingly, studies in the same field indicate that the likelihood
of apprehension and conviction does deter criminal behavior in a way that increasing
sentencing severity does not.”).
144
Mirko Bagaric et al., Halting the Senseless Civil War Against White-Collar
Offenders: “The Conduct Undermined the Integrity of the Markets” and Other Fallacies,
206 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1019, 1064 (2016).
145
E.g., id. at 1064.
146
Id.
147
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 135 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014)
(showing that sentencing enhancements created by “three-strike” laws had negligible or no
effect on crime rates); see also Bagaric et al., supra note 144, at 1064 (“The evidence
suggests that marginal deterrence is a flawed theory”); Dervan, supra note 142, at 740 (“As
noted above, increasing sentences, particularly where the conduct is already criminalized,
does not decrease the occurrence of the offense.”); see also Sandeep Gopalan &
Mirko Bagaric, Progressive Alternatives to Imprisonment in an Increasingly Punitive
(And Self-Defeating) Society, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 57, 93 (2016) (“The empirical data
on general deterrence suggests that absolute general deterrence is a valid theory. However,
marginal general deterrence seems to be flawed.”).
148
Gopalan & Bagaric, supra note 147, at 93.
142

2019]

REGULATING HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING

385

seems to be flawed in relation to all penalty types,” these scholars still
concede that absolute general deterrence does have an effect.149
Absolute general deterrence concerns whether there is any connection
whatsoever between the occurrence of criminal conduct and criminal
sanctions.150 Unlike marginal general deterrence, “[a]bsolute general
deterrence does not require or support the imposition of harsh sanctions.”
151
As opposed to marginal general deterrence, studies suggest that absolute
general deterrence does indeed work.152 When people conduct a costbenefit analysis before committing crimes, they do not weigh what will
happen to them if they are caught.153 Instead, they typically weigh the risk
of getting caught itself.154 As Mirko Bagaric, Dan Hunter, and Gabriel
Wolf have stated, “[t]he most effective means of reducing crime is not
increasing criminal penalties, but rather encouraging the perception in
people’s minds that, if they commit an offense, they will be detected and
prosecuted.”155 Therefore, what would increase deterrence of HFT
149

Bagaric et al., supra note 144, at 1064–66 (“While there does not seem to be a link
between higher penalties and less crime, it seems that people are not totally irrational when
they contemplate committing crime. The evidence shows that to the extent that people make
a cost-benefit decision about committing crimes, they generally only weigh up the risk of
being caught, not what will happen when they are apprehended.”).
150
Id. at 1064.
151
Id.
152
Id. (“The evidence suggests . . . absolute general deterrence does work. There is a
large body of literature devoted to this issue.”); Dervan, supra note 142, at 739–40
(“Interestingly, studies in the same field indicate that the likelihood of apprehension and
conviction does deter criminal behavior in a way that increasing sentencing severity does
not.”); Driggers, supra note 8, at 2036 (“Some scholars have noted that potential criminals
behave rationally in response to changes in law enforcement and crackdowns can have a
general deterrent effect on individuals, at least initially.”). See also NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 147 at 140 (“all of the evidence on the deterrent effect of certainty of
punishment pertains to the deterrent effect of the certainty of apprehension, not to the
certainty of postarrest outcomes (including certainty of imprisonment given conviction)”).
153
Bagaric et al., supra note 144, at 1066 (“While there does not seem to be a link
between higher penalties and less crime, it seems that people are not totally irrational when
they contemplate committing crime. The evidence shows that to the extent that people make
a cost-benefit decision about committing crimes, they generally only weigh up the risk of
being caught, not what will happen when they are apprehended.”).
154
Id.
155
Mirko Bagaric et al., Technological Incarceration and the End of the Prison Crisis,
108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 73, 95 (2018). See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 147, at 68 (“In contemporary society, the certainty of punishment depends on the
probability of arrest given a criminal offense and the probability of punishment given an
arrest. For a formal sanction to be imposed, the crime must be brought to official attention,
typically by victim report, and the offender must then be apprehended, usually by the police.
The offender next be charged, successfully prosecuted, and finally sentenced by the
courts.”).
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misconduct is not increased prison sentences, but rather increased criminal
enforcement.
Individual criminal liability in the HFT space would be especially
potent in its absolute general deterrence effect. High-frequency traders
would be more deterrable than non-white collar offenders because “they
have more to lose monetarily and in community standing, [] their crimes are
often calculated to bring about a specific profit[,]” and they “may be more
fearful of the possibility of jail time.”156 In analyzing the sentence of Raj
Rajaratnam, Anna Driggers noted that his sentence would:
likely be an effective deterrent. First, Rajaratnam’s sentence will send a message to a
specific population of traders, those who consider or engage in insider trading, as they
see the zeal of prosecutors and their eagerness to use new investigative techniques.
Second, the sentence upholds well-known securities laws and demonstrates the
government is serious about enforcing such laws.157

Due to the almost negligible amount of enforcement against HFT—as
evidenced by the first high-frequency trading case (Athena) not arising until
2014 and only one conviction of spoofing since it was criminalized in
2010—increased criminal enforcement of wrongdoing in the HFT space
would send an especially strong message to high-frequency traders.158
Carl Emigholz counters the belief that general deterrence has a greater
effect on white collar offenders because “certainty of apprehension, celerity
and severity—the bedrock of deterrence—are lacking in the white-collar
context.”159 He notes:
White-collar offenders often assume that they will not be caught. Most studies
conducted on white collar criminals acknowledge “the serious limitation[] in imputing
any relationship between those who commit these crimes and the likelihood of
actually being detected and formally adjudicated for the behavior.” These results are
intuitive. White-collar criminals often operate within the framework of a complicated,
legitimate organization, making detection more difficult, they have much greater
resources to resist prosecution, and the defendant is often of high social standing.
Additionally, there are not as many resources devoted to detection and prosecution of

156
See Carl Emigholz, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar-Drug Crime
Sentencing Disparity: Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 583,
609 (writing about white collar offenders in general).
157
Driggers, supra note 8, at 2036–37.
158
Similar to how Rajaratnam’s sentence will send a message to a specific population of
traders, increased criminal enforcement would likewise send a message to high-frequency
traders “as they see the zeal of prosecutors and their eagerness to use new investigative
techniques.” See id.
159
Emigholz, supra note 156, at 609.
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white-collar offenses. The combination of inadequate resources and increased
complexity greatly hinder effective enforcement.160

Lucian E. Dervan also raises the possibility that “white collar offenders are
particularly susceptible to a belief that they will not be detected because of
the often sophisticated nature of their offenses.”161
However, both scholars’ arguments necessarily presuppose that there
would be low enforcement of white collar offenses. Their arguments are
exactly why more criminal enforcement is needed in the HFT space. Given
the more sophisticated nature of HFT compared to traditional trading, highfrequency traders may be even more susceptible to the belief that they will
not be detected. Thus, increased enforcement of criminal wrongdoing
committed by HFT would demonstrate to high-frequency traders that even
though their illegal trading is extremely sophisticated, they are still
susceptible to detection and punishment. Therefore, the government,
without having to increase or demand long prison sentences,162 should
increase enforcement of criminal wrongdoing by high-frequency traders.
B. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS PREFERABLE TO
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Once it is determined that criminal law should be used to regulate
wrongdoing in the HFT space, the decision then turns to whether the
individual, the firm, or both should be held liable. The answer is
resoundingly the individual.
1.

Individual Criminal Liability Better Furthers the Goal of Deterrence

Corporations do not have certain capacities of natural persons, making
a basic characteristic of criminal law inapplicable—corporations cannot go
to jail.163 Without this aspect, criminal corporate liability does nothing to
160

Id. at 609–10.
Dervan, supra note 142, at 741.
162
See Mirko Bagaric, A Rational Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing:
Why Less is More When it Comes to Punishing Criminals, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1215
(2014) (“The objective of absolute deterrence is satisfied merely be ensuring that the penalty
invoked is something that offenders would seek to avoid, that is, they find it unpleasant. It
does not have to be particularly harsh. It is satisfied by a prison term—long or short—or, for
that matter, probation or a non-trivial fine.”).
163
Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 4–5 (2012) (“[C]riminal law has traditionally been distinguished by resort to corporal
punishment and deprivation of liberty. Since corporations cannot be beaten or jailed, this
distinctive function of criminal law is unnecessary”); see also Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate
Criminal Liability Versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability: Analyzing the Divergence in
Standards of Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 157 (“criminal law, and the concept of
161
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advance deterrence, a major goal of criminal law.164 By removing the
possibility of a prison sentence, the penalties imposed by criminal liability
are effectively those that would be imposed through civil liability, gutting
an important mechanism for deterrence.165
Individual criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing is based on the
premise that individuals culpable of the wrongdoing should be the ones
being punished.166 Deterrence is furthered by this premise; punishing those
culpable of wrongful conduct will make such conduct less likely to occur in
the future.167 However, the greatest deterrent effect comes from holding
individual actors responsible for wrongdoing.168 By extracting large
criminal fines from corporations, shareholders bear the cost of wrongdoing
for the cost of individual actors who actually committed the illegal
conduct.169 However, shareholders are not engaged in the conduct that
gives rise to the criminal offense and they are not in a position to prevent
such corporate wrongdoing.170
“An organization[,]”Andrew Weissman and David Newman write,
“cannot control the actions of its employees in the manner that an
individual typically can control her own actions.”171 While an argument
can be made that the reputational damage from a criminal conviction would
generate a sufficient deterrent effect, the reputational impact “is too
imprecise and sometimes too disconnected from the harm to be prevented
to serve as a strong justification for imposition of criminal liability.” 172
Additionally, a corporation can take all reasonable efforts to prevent
intent is dispositive in civil securities fraud cases brought against corporate defendants under
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. A central problem in this area is
the question of how a corporation, which is only a ‘person’ by an act of legal fiction, can be
said to possess a ‘unitary, discrete, and demonstrable state of mind.’”).
164
See Joan MacLeod Heminway, (Not) Holding Firms Criminally Responsible for the
Reckless Insider Trading of Their Employees, 46 STETSON L. REV. 127, 140 (2016); J. Kelly
Strader, supra note 128, at 1444 (“In retributive terms, one who acts with a purpose to cause
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wrongdoing from an employee, and yet an employee may still partake in
some criminal conduct.173 In such a case, a corporation is lacking in
volition.174 Lacking volition makes deterrence more difficult.175 Where a
corporation has already done all that it can to deter and detect illegal
behavior by its employees, then a major goal of corporate criminal liability
is satisfied.176 Holding HFT firms that engage in illegal behavior criminally
liable, without holding those traders who actually conducted the
wrongdoing liable, may accomplish very little if the firm already has
institutional mechanisms in place to prevent such behavior. Thus, criminal
corporate liability may not efficiently maximize deterrence of the wrongful
behavior.
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) even agreed that more
individual criminal liability for corporate wrongdoing was needed to
effectively deter white collar criminal behavior.177 In 2015, the DOJ issued
guidance in a memo entitled, “Individual Accountability for Corporate
Wrongdoing” (Yates Memo), encouraging department lawyers to seek
charges against individuals in cases of corporate wrongdoing.178 According
to the Yates Memo, such action is important because it incentivizes firms to
change their behavior, deters future illegal conduct, ensures that those who
committed the wrongdoing are held accountable for their actions, ensures
that the proper parties are held responsible for their actions, and fosters
public confidence in our legal system.179 “One of the most effective ways
to combat corporate misconduct,” Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
wrote, “is by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated
the wrongdoing.”180 In the antitrust context, the former DOJ Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement stated that prison
sentences for individuals convicted of antitrust crimes were “the single
most effective deterrent to the ‘temptation to cheat the system and profit
from collusion.’”181 This reasoning similarly applies to the HFT context.
173
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Individual criminal liability, accompanied with the threat of prison
sentences, would help deter high-frequency traders from using their trading
speeds to cheat the market.
2.

Wrongdoers in HFT are Easily Identifiable

An argument in favor of corporate criminal liability, as opposed to
individual criminal liability, is that it finds accountability when the culpable
individual is not easily identifiable.182 Such situations arise when
individual culpability is masked by the corporate structure and size of the
company, making it difficult to investigate and prosecute corporate
wrongdoing.183 This is not the case with HFT.
Whereas other types of white collar offenses may include many
different decisions that are implemented by many different employees, HFT
involves one person devising a plan and that same person carrying it out—
the trader. Coscia is illustrative of how, at least in HFT, the trader is easily
identifiable as the person who planned and conducted the criminal
conduct.184 As mentioned previously, the creator of the program that
Coscia utilized to carry out his scheme testified that Coscia had directed
him to create a program that would cancel orders in certain circumstances,
demonstrating that Coscia had devised the plan to spoof.185 Coscia was also
the one to place and cancel orders, creating the false impression of supply
and demand in the market.186 Thus, Coscia was easily identifiable as the
individual who planned to spoof, ordered others to assist him in creating a
computer program capable of carrying out that plan, and conducted the
actual placement and canceling of trade orders. Therefore, as illustrated by
Coscia, the identity problem that corporate criminal liability attempts to
solve is not nearly as present in HFT.
3.

Individual Criminal Liability Would Lead to Better Consequences

From a consequentialist approach, pursuing individual criminal
liability as opposed to corporate criminal liability is more ideal. Holding
firms criminally liable for HFT misconduct leads to two suboptimal choices
182
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for the government: 1) issuing waivers so that the firm could still operate—
effectively making the criminal conviction meaningless;187 or 2) letting the
firm suffer the full consequences of a criminal conviction and risk the
downfall of the corporation.188 The latter would cause many innocent
employees to lose their jobs189 and would likely be unpopular for
governments.
An example of the first choice is the 2015 guilty plea of large banks
for conspiring to manipulate the Foreign Exchange (FX) market.190 Four
banks—JPMorgan & Chase Co., Citicorp, the Royal Bank of Scotland PLC,
and Barclays PLC—pleaded guilty to conspiring to manipulate the price of
U.S. Dollars and Euros exchanged in the FX spot market.191 The banks
agreed to pay $2.5 billion in total criminal fines.192 However, aside from
these fines, the consequences the banks faced for pleading guilty to a felony
were merely symbolic.193 Although regulators could have barred these
banks from conducting certain activities, the banks were able to negotiate
and receive exemptions from regulators.194 For example, by the time the
guilty pleas were announced, the SEC had already provided several waivers
to the banks that allowed them “to conduct business as usual[]”—
eviscerating the consequence of a criminal conviction.195 A waiver
provided to a HFT firm convicted of a crime would similarly strip the
conviction of any teeth.
The alternative is an arguably worse outcome. If a convicted HFT firm
is not granted a waiver to continue operations, then it may need to close
down. Many innocent employees and shareholders would lose jobs and
money as a result.196 For certain statutes, prosecutors only have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that one employee out of all of a company’s
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employees violated the law.197 But instead of just that one employee being
punished, all employees are punished. Rather than punishing the culpable,
which is supposed to be one of the justifications for criminal law,198 it
would also punish the innocent. Therefore, corporate criminal liability
would be too broad.
The 2001 Arthur Andersen LLP conviction is illustrative of this.199
The government never suggested at trial that a part of Arthur Andersen, or
even senior management, was corrupt.200 The government simply had to
prove that any one Arthur Andersen employee, out of the 28,000 employed
in the U.S. at the time, had, beyond a reasonable doubt, “acted knowingly
and with intent to cause or induce another person or persons to (a) withhold
a record or document from an official proceeding, or (b) alter, destroy,
mutilate or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s availability
for use in an official proceeding.”201 This prosecution eventually led to the
demise of Arthur Andersen.202 After a federal jury convicted Arthur
Andersen “of obstruction of justice in connection with its destruction of
documents relating to its accounting work for Enron Corporation[]” in June
2002, the firm agreed to end its practice of auditing public companies—
effectively closing its business.203 As a result, “[a]pproximately 28,000
people lost their jobs at the company in the United States alone.”204
Twenty-eight thousand employees were punished due to just one employee
being convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.205 As this example shows,
holding HFT firms liable for the acts of any one trader, who does not even
have to be a part of senior management or have a significant impact on the
firm, can have disastrous consequences for the rest of the employees who
may be innocent.
IV. CONCLUSION
New technology provides new opportunities to commit crimes,206 and
HFT is no exception.207
Locking up high-frequency traders who
197
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intentionally violate federal regulations may seem like a harsh method of
regulating HFT. However, as Coscia has shown, through the intentionality
element in the anti-spoofing provision and a reasonable doubt standard,
criminal enforcement of high-frequency traders charged with similar crimes
will only lead to convictions when there is powerful evidence of their
wrongdoing. This Comment does not advocate for a witch hunt of highfrequency traders, but merely increased criminal enforcement of those
especially egregious offenders. Nor does this Comment advocate for long
prison sentences for convicted high-frequency traders. The actual prison
time served could be as short as a few months. What is important to deter
high-frequency traders is simply the threat of prosecution, not what happens
once they are actually caught.208 Due to the infrequency of convictions in
HFT, increased enforcement would serve notice to other high-frequency
traders that the government is serious about prosecuting criminal conduct in
HFT, no matter how sophisticated their new technology is—thus, deterring
future HFT wrongdoing209 and satisfying a major goal of criminal law.210
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